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The Quality of Open Source Production:
Zealots and Good Samaritans in the Case of Wikipedia

Abstract
New forms of production based in electronic technology, such as open-source and opencontent production, convert private commodities (typically software) into essentially
public goods. A number of studies find that, like in other collective goods, incentives for
reputation and group identity motivate contributions to open source goods, thereby
overcoming the social dilemma inherent in producing such goods. In this paper we
examine how contributor motivations affect the quality of contributions to the opencontent online encyclopedia Wikipedia. We find that quality is associated with
contributor motivations, but in a surprisingly inconsistent way. Registered users’ quality
increases with more contributions, consistent with the idea of participants motivated by
reputation and commitment to the Wikipedia community. Surprisingly, however, we find
the highest quality from the vast numbers of anonymous “Good Samaritans” who
contribute only once. Our findings that Good Samaritans as well as committed “zealots”
contribute high quality content to Wikipedia suggest that it is the quantity as well as the
quality of contributors that positively affects the quality of open source production.

Word count: 169

The Quality of Open Source Production:
Zealots and Good Samaritans in the Case of Wikipedia
I. Introduction
When we think about the revolution in information and communication
technologies over the past decade we might fail to recognize some of the amazing
organizational innovations that have also emerged (cf. Neff and Stark 2003; O’Mahony
2003). One of the most important of these organizational innovations is the emergence of
“open source” production (also known as “open content”), defined as the free and open
creation, alteration and distribution of goods, typically software, via the contributions
from vast numbers of widely distributed and uncoordinated actors (Lakhani and Wolf
2005; Open Source Initiative 2005). Open source production is remarkable because it
converts a private commodity (typically software) into essentially a public good (Kollock
1999; Kogut and Metiu 2001; O’Mahony 2003).1 Indeed, advocates of open source
software often describe it as a “movement,” similar to social movements for other public
goods (Raymond 2001; Stallman 1999; Torvalds and Diamond 2001).
Early studies of open source suggest that production is fueled by a small number
of experts who contribute much of the content (Ghosh and Prakash 2000; Mockus et al
2005; Lerner and Tirole 2002; Lakhani and von Hippel 2002). According to this
research, these experts are motivated by factors such as reputation and group identity,
mechanisms identified by social scientists as capable of overcoming the social dilemma
inherent in collective goods production. Here we move beyond examinations of what
motivates contributors to ask, how are contributor motivations related to the quality of
open source goods?
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In general public goods are chronically under produced in society (Olson 1965).
Given the inherent social dilemma in producing public goods (Olson 1965; Hardin 1968;
Kollock 1998), open source production would seem to be based on a problematic and
inefficient model. Some argue, however, that open source production can be not only
efficient (Kogut and Metiu 2001), but even superior (e.g., von Hippel 2001; Weber 2005)
to other forms of production. Indeed the success of open source software implies that
open source production may be of superior quality to privately produced software (e.g.,
Mockus et al 2005; cf. Neumann 2005). Do the collective action mechanisms that
motivate contributions to open source goods also explain the quality of those goods? In
seeking to answer this question, this paper makes three contributions. First, we theorize
the relation between contributor motivations in open source goods and quality using the
case of the online, open-content encyclopedia, Wikipedia.org. Second, we use data from
7,058 contributors to Wikipedia.org to test hypotheses about contributor motivations and
quality. Finally, we consider the implications for organizing collective action given our
findings that suggest that it is both the quantity and quality of contributors that positively
affects the quality of open source production goods.

II. The Case of Wikipedia
Wikipedia, the online, open content encyclopedia (www.wikipedia.org) is a
compelling example of open source production. According to its Main Page, Wikipedia is
“the free-content encyclopedia that anyone can edit.” The English language version,
started in 2001, currently has the most content with over 1.75 million articles (as of April
2007). Wikipedia describes itself as “a multilingual, web-based, free content
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encyclopedia project. Wikipedia is written collaboratively by volunteers; its articles can
be edited by anyone with access to the Internet” (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia).
It has editions in roughly 200 different languages and contains entries both on traditional
encyclopedic topics and on almanac, gazetteer, and current events topics.
Not only is Wikipedia content open access, but the creation and revision of the
content is also entirely open such that anyone can add to or edit any entry. The precursor
to Wikipedia was conceived by developers Jimmy Wales and Larry Sanger as a freely
accessible encyclopedia, but the quality was to be ensured by seeking expert
contributions evaluated by peer review (see Lih 2004;
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia#History). In contrast, Wikipedia as it now exists
succeeded by replacing professional contributions and expert peer review with their most
democratic extremes: no proof of identity or qualifications is necessary in order to
contribute or edit content.
As with any encyclopedia, the value of Wikipedia is the quality of its content, yet
its overall quality is a much debated issue. In the few systematic studies comparing
quality of content between Wikipedia and professionally produced encyclopedias,
Wikipedia is found to be comparable in quality (Giles 2005; Lih 2004; cf. Encyclopedia
Britannica 2006). Yet questions about quality persist. The concerns about quality in
Wikipedia, in both popular press and scholarly accounts, focus on the nature and skills of
the contributors and editors (Giles 2005; Encyclopedia Britannica 2006; Nature 2006;
Orlowski 2005; Terdiman 2005; Wagstaff 2004). Given that the creation of its content is
completely open, quality depends entirely on who contributes to Wikipedia. Yet, as noted
by critics, why would any actor, let alone an expert, contribute?
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One simple factor encouraging contributions to Wikipedia and other open source
goods is the low cost of contributing (Lerner and Tirole 2002). The very ‘wiki’
technology used by Wikipedia reduces the costs of participation. A ‘wiki’ is an online
document in which every edit made to it is saved as a unique document. Wikipedia is a
collection of wiki-pages on specific topics for which the entire edit history of the topic is
available. This means that any user can view past edits, add his or her own content, and
even restore a previous version of the content. The formal policies of Wikipedia, as well
as the wiki technology, help to limit (though not prevent) negative contributions, such as
nonsense contributions or so-called graffiti attacks. For example, Ciffolilli (2003) argues
that because Wikipedia is a wiki that saves all past versions of every article, it is very
easy for friendly contributors to ‘clean up’ a damaged article. Research by IBM similarly
shows that graffiti and damage to controversial topic pages are repaired quickly at
Wikipedia (Wattenberg and Viegas 2003).
Beyond the cost factor, a plausible reason for the apparent high quality of
Wikipedia is that contributors can benefit from participating, such as by building a
reputation within the community. Reputation systems are powerful mechanisms for
overcoming collective action problems (Cheshire and Cook 2004; Kollock 1998; Raub
and Weesie 1990). Indeed, reputation systems are the basis for success of other new
Internet-based institutions, such as the auction website eBay (Kollock 1999). Some
researchers argue that reputation systems could be the basis for all secure Internet-based
communication and exchange (e.g., Camp et al 2002; Cheshire and Cook 2004). In
studies of various open source projects, one of the primary reasons cited for making
contributions is the individual incentives of skill-development and building a reputation
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(Kollock 1999; Lakhani and von Hippel 2003; Lakhani and Wolf 2005; Lerner and Tirole
2002; von Krogh et al 2003). Reputation mechanisms motivate participation in open
source goods because they provide the basis for status in the community (Stewart 2005).
Wikipedia recognizes the power of reputation and encourages contributors to
become ‘registered users’ by outlining the benefits of having an account
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Why_create_an_account, April 2007).
According to Wikipedia, there are now over 4 million registered user accounts, “plus an
unknown, but quite large, number of unregistered contributors”
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Wikipedians April 2007).
Though registered-user names are still merely ‘cheap’ pseudonyms (Friedman and
Resnick 1999) that are easily abandoned and not necessarily tied to an individual’s real
identity, they provide a mechanism for establishing and tracking reputation. For any
given subject in Wikipedia, users can view the history of contributions. A user can see
edits that were contributed by registered Wikipedians (see below), while anonymous
contributors have no name but merely have an IP address listed. An IP or InternetProtocol address is a 32-digit number used to identify a computer or device on computer
networks connected to the Internet. Clicking on a registered user name takes one to the
“user’s page,” Wikipedia-space where registered users create personalized pages about
themselves and their contributions to Wikipedia, if they choose to do so. Wikipedia even
lists the top 1,000 contributors with the most edits, some of whom have been identified
by name in the popular press (e.g., Terdiman 2005). Contributors with no interest in
reputation can remain anonymous. Though anonymous users are listed by IP address
only, it is possible to view the history of an IP address similar to a registered user, if more
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than one contribution is made. As shown below, however, the majority of anonymous
users have only one contribution.
In addition to reputation, some contributors are motivated by an apparent strong
commitment to the community of “Wikipedians” (Giles 2005;
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia_community, accessed 4/2/2007). The salience of
a group identity can increase contributions to collective goods (Dawes 1980; Kramer and
Brewer 1984; Dawes, van de Kragt and Orbell 1990; Turner and Tajfal 1986), including
open-source projects (Raymond 1999) and virtual communities (Wellman and Gulia
1999), even though such groups often exist only in virtual ‘online’ space. Such
contributors may even be “zealots”, Coleman’s (1990) term for true believers in a
collective good who contribute for purely intrinsic value beyond rational expectations
(see, e.g., Lakhani and Wolf 2005; Raymond 1999).
Wikipedia clearly presents itself as a community: “Wikipedians are the people
who write and edit articles for Wikipedia…Wikipedian [] suggests someone who is part
of a group or community. So in this sense, Wikipedians are people who form the
Wikipedia Community” (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Wikipedians accessed
April 2007). One of the top links on the main webpage is for the “Community Portal”
which contains information about many different ways that users can participate in the
community of Wikipedia.
According to this discussion, contributors to Wikipedia are motivated by two
factors: (1) reputation and/or (2) commitment to the group identity of the Wikipedia
community. How might these motivations influence the quality of contributions?
Certainly motivations influence participation in Wikipedia. Contributors interested in
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building a reputation will register since this is the only way to establish a reputation,
while contributors with no interest in reputation will remain anonymous. Identity with
the community, in contrast, has implications for the level of participation. Users who
identify as Wikipedians participate in the community by making many contributions,
while contributors who do not identify with the community will likely have few
contributions.
It is straightforward to consider the quality implications for contributors at the
intersection of strong interest in reputation and a strong Wikipedia identity, i.e., registered
users with many contributions. They are the committed-expert contributors and zealots
expected by advocates of open-source, and so are expected to have high quality
contributions. The ability to identify and track the contributions of registered users,
particularly over many contributions, also suggests such users interested in gaining a
positive reputation will make many contributions. Moreover, we can also expect that
registered users’ with the most contributions will have the highest quality, else they
would not be able to gain a positive reputation. This discussion suggests the following
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1a: Registered users will have more contributions than non-registered
users.
Hypothesis 1b: Quality will be highest among registered users with many
contributions, and
Hypothesis 1c: Quality will increase with participation (number of contributions)
for registered users.

7

What are the implications for quality for anonymous contributors? Virtually all
theories of social dilemmas would predict low quality from anonymous contributors,
especially those with low levels of participation, since they would seem to have little
motivation or incentives to contribute at all. Yet the lore of open-source suggests that
anonymous one-time contributors are as important as the zealots. Who are these Good
Samaritan contributors? They are likely to be of two types. The first type of Good
Samaritans may be, like the zealots, experts in a particular field. These experts do not
care about their reputation in Wikipedia (no registration), nor are they committed to
Wikipedia as a community (few contributions). Instead they care about their area of
expertise and so contribute to that topic only. Taking the time to register would increase
the costs of contributing for these Good Samaritans, and since they are not interested in
reputation and do not identify with the community itself, they have no reason to incur
these costs. Given their expertise in the subject matter, however, their contributions will
be of high quality.
The second type of Good Samaritan is simply the user who sees a mistake or a
hole and makes a contribution to address it. These contributions are likely to be shorter
and less substantive than others and so will be less likely to be edited or changed in the
future.
In contrast to registered users whose quality is highest at high levels of
participation, in both cases of the Good Samaritans, we expect that it is anonymous users
with the fewest contributions that will have the highest quality.
But what are the quality implications for anonymous users with high levels of
participation? As noted above, high participation levels suggest that the contributor
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strongly identifies with the Wikipedia community. Why would a Wikipedian who
strongly identifies with the community by participating at a high level choose to remain
anonymous? One possibility might be that the multiple contributions from a single IPaddress are not from the same contributor at all, but rather the result of proxies or
dynamic IP-address allocation in some large companies and universities. Though
plausible, it is unlikely that dynamic IP-addresses account for many contributors, in part
because Wikipedia frequently blocks such networks and proxy servers.
Another possibility for why some anonymous users might have many
contributions is that such users know their contributions are of low quality and do not
want to be identified through a registered user name. Alternatively, many contributions
may mean that these users are strongly committed to the Wikipedia community, but
unlike the registered Wikipedians described above, their interest may be negative rather
than positive. These would-be “hackers” may actively seek to contribute low-quality
content to harm the community.
The motivations of anonymous contributors, including both Good Samaritans and
high participation-anonymous contributors, leads to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2a: Anonymous users will have shorter contributions than registered
users.
Hypothesis 2b: Anonymous users with few contributions will have high quality
content, and
Hypothesis 2c: Quality of contributions will decrease with participation for
anonymous users.
We now turn to data from Wikipedia contributors to analyze these questions.
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III. Data and Methods
We selected samples of Wikipedia contributors from the populations of both the
French and Dutch language sites as of March 1, 2005.2, 3 By March 2005 Wikipedia was
well known, but significant debate over the quality of its content had not yet occurred
(Encyclopedia Britannica 2006; Giles 2005). As of March 1 2005 there were a total of
53,901 contributors to the French language site and 33,217 contributors to the Dutch
language site. The sampling procedure consisted of compiling a list of all contributors
within each language group, then drawing two random draws within each language of up
to 1,000 contributors for each user-type (registered and anonymous), for a total of
n=7,058. (See Table 1.) Since registered users are over-represented in our sample
compared to their distribution among all contributors, we weight the analyses based on
the population proportions of each user-type within each language group.

Variables
We hypothesize that contributor motivations effect the quality of their
contributions. That is, we are not measuring the quality of Wikipedia content per se, but
rather the quality of Wikipedia contributors. We measure the quality of contributions
quantitatively as the rate of each contributor’s content retained in the current version of
the topic article. Retention is only one quantitative dimension of the quality of a
contribution, and likely a conservative measure to the extent that contributors and editors
are satisficing (Simon 1957) rather than maximizing with regard to content, that is,
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adding to or editing an entry until it is ‘good enough’ rather than until it is in some sense
“perfect” or “complete.”
The dependent variable is the retention rate, R, of contributions, measured as the
percent of characters retained per contribution by each contributor. More specifically, we
measure the number of characters retained, C, in a given article, summed across all edits
(contributions), j, for each contributor, i, divided by the sum of the total number of
characters, T, in each topic article edited per contributor.

K

Ri =

!C

ij

j =1
K

!T

ij

j =1

For each contributor, we use the Wikipedia differencing algorithm4 to compare the
differences among three documents: (1) edit, the content submitted to each topic article
by the contributor, (2) previous, the version of the article prior to the edit, and (3) current,
the version of the article as it exists on the day the sample was drawn. Edits generally
occur in time prior to the time point at which current is measured, so current does not in
general equal edit, though it is possible if the contributor contributed all of the current
content. We measure the retention of an edit by calculating the number of characters
from a contributor’s edit (comparing edit to previous) that are retained in the current
version (comparing edit to current) as a percentage of the total number of characters in
the article. For example, compare the following illustrative sentences, previous: “Public
goods are unlike private goods;” edit: “Public goods, in contrast to private goods, are
non-excludable;” and current: “In contrast to private goods, public goods are nonexcludable and non-rival.” Comparing edit to current, we find that (when considering
11

longest common subsequences) 62 of the total 75 characters in the current version are
retained for a retention rate of 83% (note that spaces are counted in the character count).
As illustrated in this example, a contributor’s edit may include any of the
following: added material, edited or deleted content, as well as content kept from the
previous version. That means that our measure of retention includes all characters in the
version ‘submitted’ by the contributor, no matter how much or how little of the content
was added, deleted or changed by the contributor. The reasoning for this is that a
contributor has the opportunity to add, edit or delete whatever she chooses, so preserving
content from earlier versions is taken to mean at least tacit acceptance of its quality. It is
important to note that Wikipedia requires that contributors edit on the granularity of
whole entries. For example, the data structure does not permit "journaling" in which a
contributor might submit an edit such as: "like before, except change sentence 23 as
follows." The number of characters added, retained and total are pooled across all edits
made by each contributor. Overall, the mean retention rate at Wikipedia is 72%. (See
Table 2.)
We recognize that retention rate does not take into account all important features
of content quality in Wikipedia, including, for example, “edit wars”, in which two or
more contributors continually change the content of a topic-entry, sometimes merely
using the wiki to return the article to a previous version of the text. Other important
factors that we cannot address are the amount of time lapsed between edits, or the status
of the content, e.g., whether the topic being edited is “under construction” or in the
parlance of Wikipedia, a “stub” in which only a very brief entry on the topic exists.
These issues are most important when evaluating the quality of content itself, i.e., the
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coverage of specific topic areas in which the history of the ‘page’ is important. In this
study, however, we are interested in evaluating the quality of contributors, so we analyze
their retention rates.
The key independent variables are whether a contributor is registered or
anonymous and their number of contributions. Contributor registration status is
measured by whether they have a registered user name or not. Number of contributions
is measured as the number of times a contributor made an edit. On average, contributors
made over 9 edits, with a range of 1-50 edits. Given the significant positive skew of this
measure, we take the natural log in the analyses. Finally, our analyses also control for
language area (French = 1, Dutch = 0), the total size of each article, measured as the total
number of characters (natural log), and the size of the contribution, measured as the
number of characters added per edit (natural log). Contribution size controls for the
likelihood that the smaller the contribution the more likely it is to be a minor change and
thus more likely to be retained. Article size controls for the possibility that registered and
anonymous users contribute to fundamentally different types of Wikipedia topics. Since
Wikipedia content is constantly evolving, at any given time there are many “new topics”
with relatively small existing entries, as well as many well-established topics with a great
deal of existing content. It may be that anonymous users are more likely to contribute
only to well-established articles, or conversely only to newer topics with less existing
content.

IV. Results
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Table 3 shows the bivariate results for each variable by user type. Anonymous
and registered users differ in important ways. Overall, registered users contribute more
content across a greater number of edits compared to anonymous users, consistent with
Hypotheses 1a and 2a. Surprisingly however, anonymous users contribute higher quality
content overall compared to registered users. Given the expected motivations of
reputation and identity among registered users, i.e., the zealots and committed experts,
this is remarkable.
Table 4 shows the retention rates for contributors by the intersection of the two
contributor motivations, reputation and commitment. Both committed experts and Good
Samaritans have high quality contributions, supporting hypotheses 1b and 2b. Committed
experts’ (cell 1) contributions are of significantly higher quality compared to registered
users with fewer contributions (cell 2). They are also significantly higher than
anonymous users with similar numbers of contributions.
TABLES 3 AND 4 ABOUT HERE
Good Samaritans (cell 4 in Table 4) make the highest quality contributions
overall. Good Samaritans contribute higher quality content than either registered users
with similar levels of participation (cell 2), other anonymous users with more
contributions (cell 3), and even registered users with many contributions (cell 1) though
the latter is significant at the p<.10 level.
The bivariate results shown in Table 4 also suggest support for hypotheses 1c and
2c about the relationship between quality and contributions for different types of
contributors. Figure 1 displays the estimated regression lines for the quality of
contributions (retention rate) regressed on commitment (log number of contributions) for
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both registered and anonymous users. Figure 1 shows that indeed quality changes with
the extent of participation but in exactly the opposite direction for registered versus
anonymous users. Anonymous users’ quality is highest at low levels of commitment, and
decreases as participation increases, while the opposite is true for registered users for
whom quality increases with participation.
TABLES 5 AND 6 ABOUT HERE
We now turn to the multivariate analysis. Table 5 shows the results of
multivariate regressions of the quality of contributions on levels of participation,
controlling for article size, size of contribution and language, for registered and
anonymous users. Hypotheses 1b and 2b are both supported in Table 5. Whereas log
edits is positive for registered users, indicating increasing quality with increasing
participation, it is negative for anonymous users.
It is important to note that the control variables are also significant in explaining
the quality of contributions. The shorter a contribution is the higher its quality, for both
registered and anonymous users. Quality is also higher when the topic article being edited
is larger, regardless of the type of contributor. It may be that the larger a topic articles is,
the more complete the information already included, so only those certain of their
knowledge (i.e., experts, whether registered or anonymous) contribute to such articles. In
addition, French contributors in general are less likely to have their contributions retained
compared to Dutch contributors. We do not speculate as to why this may be the case.
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
Another way to look at the relationship between quality and quantity for different
types of contributors is to examine the effects among those with few contributions
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compared to those with many. Table 6 shows the results of quality regressed on the type
of user, controlling for the amount contributed, article size and language among those
with fewer than five edits, and those with five or more edits. Consistent with the findings
presented above, among those with fewer than five edits, registered users, compared to
anonymous users (the omitted category), have significantly lower quality, but for those
with five or more edits, registered users have higher quality.

V. Discussion and Conclusion
Why should we care about understanding the quality of Wikipedia contributions?
One reason is that Wikipedia is becoming a “source of record” increasingly cited by
mainstream print and news media (Lih 2004). For example, a search for Wikipedia in the
top world newspapers in Lexis/Nexis for the period January 1-May 25, 2007 yielded 300
articles. (See also http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Wikipedia_in_media.) In part
because of its exposure in mass media, readers of the Wikipedia.org website also are
increasing dramatically. According to a website that tracks the traffic (number of
visitors) to websites, www.alexa.com, the Wikipedia website ranks 10th in the Global Top
500 websites (accessed May 2007). As of October 2005 Wikipedia ranked as the top
reference site (www.alexa.com).
While contributors to Wikipedia vary in their interests in reputation and their
commitment to the group, readers’ main interest is simply the quality of the content, i.e.,
whether the material is accurate and reliable. Wikipedia readers, however, are highly
uncertain about the quality of its content because they cannot rely on editors or publishers
to screen for quality as they can when using a brand name encyclopedia. Readers’

16

uncertainty may lead them to look at types of contributors for different signals of quality,
such as registration or high levels of participation. A registered user name provides
access to the history of contributions for that contributor (i.e., reputation), and as such,
readers may look to a contributor’s history, or even take registration itself, as a signal of
quality. Alternatively, readers may consider that a strong identity in Wikipedia is
necessary for quality content, and so expect that only those with many contributions (i.e.,
Wikipedians, whether registered or not) will contribute high quality content. To the
extent that readers look for the intersection of registration and high participation, our
analysis suggests they will indeed find high quality content from the committed expert
contributors. Either signal alone, however, suggests they will not find high quality
material. Further, attention to these signals alone may hinder readers from recognizing
the high quality contributions of Good Samaritans who contribute one-time only and
anonymously.
A more important reason to care about the quality of Wikipedia is because it
serves as an apparently successful example of a new form of production: open-source
production (Kogut and Meitiu 2001; von Hippel 2002). Open source production
essentially involves creating a public good, and therefore entails the same social dilemma
that confronts the production and maintenance of other public goods. The intersection of
two well-known mechanisms for overcoming social dilemmas, reputation and group
identity, account for some of the variation in the quality of contributions to the open
source encyclopedia, Wikipedia. Consistent with the expectations of the open source
community and with previous studies of open source goods, we find that zealots and
highly committed experts contribute high quality content. Yet, these mechanisms fail to

17

account for the very high quality content provided by anonymous Good Samaritans who
do not care about reputation, and contribute only a few times.
The findings of lower quality for anonymous contributors with high participation
indicate a strong but negative interest in the collective good which, if left unchecked,
could destroy the open source good much as other commons can be destroyed by similar
collective action problems. To deal with the negative impact of this group of contributors
Wikipedia has instituted a policy that requires contributors to register after some number
of anonymous contributions. Of course a policy of required registration is somewhat
contrary to the ideal of open source and open access, and could potentially inhibit Good
Samaritans. Since the majority of anonymous contributors make only one, high quality
edit, such a policy may not be very problematic.
Our finding that anonymous Good Samaritans contribute high quality content to
open source goods is both novel and unexpected. One reason the role of Good
Samaritans may have been overlooked in other studies of collective goods is because we
rarely have data for all contributions, large and small, over the entire production history
of public goods. For example, studies of participation in social movements focus on the
role of individual incentives, social networks and collective resources (e.g.,
McAdam1982, 1988; Opp et al 1995) that facilitate the contributions of highly committed
participants. Alternatively, laboratory studies of collective goods necessarily create
highly structured contexts that do not allow participation from actors outside of the study,
such as potential Good Samaritan contributors who happen to pass by. However, it also
may be because of the scope of open source production, which enables vast numbers of
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contributors to participate, that Good Samaritan contributors can play such an important
role in producing collective goods.
Sociologists have argued that social actors vary in both resources and levels of
motivation to contribute to collective goods, so a critical mass of heterogeneous
contributors is necessary to produce them (Marwell and Oliver 1993; Heckathorn 1992).
While recognizing that production functions vary across types of collective goods
(Marwell and Oliver 1993; Heckathorn 1992, 1996), open source production reduces the
costs of contributing and expands the population of potential contributors so much that a
critical mass is more likely to be reached early in the production process, and to be
maintained throughout the ongoing production of open-source goods. In other words,
open source production alters the quantity of producers, which in turn affects the quality
of the production process itself. Our findings that one-time, anonymous Good
Samaritans, as well as committed experts, contribute high quality content to Wikipedia
suggest that open source production enables the exploitation of untapped productive
resources that overcome barriers to efficient production of collective goods.
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Notes
1. Clean air, bridges and ocean habitats are all examples of public goods. Economists
define public goods, in contrast to private goods, as a type of good that is non-excludable
and non-rival, and often also requires joint production. Non-excludable means that once
the good is produced it is available to all, though ‘all’ may be restricted by geography
(e.g., you have to be in the White Mountains to breathe the clean air) or other
characteristics, such as citizenship. A non-rival good is one in which consumption of the
good does not reduce its availability. Finally, many public goods must be collectively
(jointly) produced either because the vastness of the resources required prevent one
individual from producing it, or because the good itself requires the contributions of
many actors (e.g., a group discussion). Public goods often are under-produced because
individual and collective interests do not align9, 20 - 21 and because they lack a critical
mass of potential contributors17.
2. Data are available on request from the authors, on the condition that it not be shared
subsequently or used for commercial purposes (please send requests via email to:
wikidatarequest@dartmouth.edu).
3. The nature of the sampling procedure inhibited us from extracting data from the
significantly larger English-language Wikipedia. It is possible that our findings apply
only to the French and Dutch language content, because of cultural differences or other
unknown reasons. Future research on other language areas is necessary to verify the
findings we report here.
4. Wikipedia uses a PHP port of Perl's Algorithm::Diff module 1.06, which uses the
Longest Common Subsequence approach to computing string differences. PHP is an

20

open-source programming language used for developing applications, dynamic web
content, and software.
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Table 1. Population and Sample of Wikipedia Contributors by User Type and Language
User Type
Language

Registered

Anonymous

Total

Population

5,690

48,211

53,901

Sample

1,763

1,729

3,492

Population

2,895

30,322

33,217

Sample

1,819

1,747

3,566

Population

8,585

78,533

87,118

Sample

3,582

3,476

7,058

French

Dutch

Total
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Table 2. Means for Wikipedia Contributor Characteristics (unweighted)

Number of Cases
Retention Rate
Number of Edits

Total

French

Dutch

7,058

3,566

3,492

72.1 (29.0)

73.7 (28.4)
9.7 (15.5)

1.3 (1.3)

1.2 (1.3)

1.2 (1.4)

4,412 (5,886)

5,054 (6,869)

3,784 (4,647)

7.8 (1.2)

7.9 (1.2)

7.7 (1.2)

Contribution Size

358 (1,545)

358 (1,089)

358 (1,889)

Log Contribution

4.8 (1.6)

5.7 (2.5)

5.7 (2.5)

Article Size
Log Article Size

Registered User

(15.0)

(29.6)

9.0 (14.5)

Log Edits

9.4

70.4

51%

51%

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
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51%

Table 3. Wikipedia Contribution Characteristics by Type of User (unweighted)
Registered User
Quality

70.3 (28.4)

Anonymous User
74.0** (29.5)

F = 29.7**
df = 1, 7,056

Log Edits

1.9** (1.4)

0.60 (.83)

F = 2,058.0**
df = 1, 7,056

Log Contribution size

6.9** (2.3)

4.5 (2.1)

F = 1,955**
df = 1, 7,056

Log Article Size

7.8 (1.1)

7.8 (1.3)

F = 0.89
df = 1, 7,056

French language

.49 (.50)

.50 (.50)

F = 0.19
df = 1, 7,056

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
** p < .01
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Table 4. Content Retention Rates by Contributor Motivations

Level of Commitment
1

Interest in Reputation
Strong:
Weak:
Registered Users
Anonymous Users
3

Strong:
5+ contributions

73% (.23) 1,2
n=1,941
2

Weak:
1-4 contributions

4
67% (.36)
n=1,641

Note: standard deviations in parentheses.
1

cell 1 > cell 2 ANOVA F = 47.8, p<.001

2

cell 1 > cell 3 ANOVA F = 11.3, p<.001

3

cell 4 > cell 3 ANOVA F = 14.4, p<.001

4

cell 4 > cell 2 ANOVA F = 70.1, p<.001

5

cell 4 > cell 1 ANOVA F = 3.59, p<.10

69% (.26)
n=469

29

75% (.30) 3,4,5
n=3,007

Table 5. OLS Unstandardized Coefficients of Quality of Contributions for Registered
versus Anonymous Users (weighted)

Registered Users

Anonymous Users

Constant

.39**

(.04)

.54**

(.04)

Log Article Size

.06**

(.005)

.05**

(.004)

Log Contribution
Size

-.03**

(.003)

-.03**

(.003)

French Language

-.03**

(.01)

-.05**

(.01)

Log Edits

.02**

(.003)

-.01+

(.006)

Adjusted R2
Unweighted N

+ p < .10

.07

.08

3,582

3,476

* p < .05

** p < .01

Note: Standard Error terms in parentheses.
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Figure 1. Quality of Wikipedia Contributions by Number of Contributions for Registered
and Anonymous Users.

for Registered versus Anonymous Users

Zealots

.68

.7

.72

.74

Good Samaritans

.66

% Retained

.76

Quality (% retained) by Contributions (log edits)

0

1

2
log edits

Registered User

3
Anonymous User
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4

Table 6. OLS Unstandardized Coefficients of Quality of Contributions by Level of
Contribution (weighted)
Few Contributions
< 5 edits

Many Contributions
> 5 edits

.54** (.03)

.39** (.05)

Log Article Size

.05** (.003)

.06** (.01)

Log Contribution Size

-.03** (.002)

-.03** (.004)

French Language

-.06** (.01)

-.014 (.01)

Registered User

-.05** (.02)

.05** (.01)

Constant

Adjusted R2
Unweighted N
** p < .01

.08

.06

4,647

2,410

Note: Standard Error terms in parentheses.
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